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Abstract
The Common Monetary Area (CMA) is a multilateral agreement that provides a
framework for a fixed exchange rate regime between the South-African Rand and
the currencies of Lesotho, Eswatini, and Namibia (LEN). The nature of the ar-
rangement restrains the LEN countries from exercising independent discretionary
monetary policy. As a result, they must rely on the South African authorities
for policy formulation and implementation. Interest rates in the LEN countries
cannot deviate too far from those in South Africa. Given this limited scope for
monetary policy in the LEN countries, this study investigates how each mem-
ber country adjusts to shocks to the South African monetary policy instrument.
Specifically, this paper uses a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model to
examine how economic output, inflation, narrow money supply, domestic credit,
and lending rate spread in each member country react to shocks experienced in the
South African repo rate using monthly data from the period 2000M2 to 2018M12.
The main findings indicate that a positive shock to the South African repo rate
tends to be followed by a decline in economic output and an appreciation in price
levels at the 90 percent confidence interval for all CMA countries. Our results have
also shown that there is an asymmetric response in money supply, domestic credit
and lending rate spread between the LEN countries and South Africa, to a positive
repo rate shock. These results suggest that policymakers in LEN countries must
implement additional policy measures to circumvent the negative impact of South
Africa’s monetary policy on their financial sectors.
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11 Introduction
The Common Monetary Area (CMA) is a multilateral agreement that provides
a framework for a fixed exchange rate regime between the South African rand
(ZAR) and the currencies of Lesotho, Eswatini1, and Namibia (LEN countries).
The main objective of this currency union is to foster the sustained economic de-
velopment and advancement of the less developed members (Wang et al., 2007).
The Agreement gives member countries the power to issue their local currencies
with the South-African bilateral agreements dictating the areas where the curren-
cies are legal tenders. A crucial concern about the structure of the CMA is the
absence of a joint central bank that is responsible for conducting monetary policy
interventions and is accountable to all member countries. The CMA arrangement
constrains the LEN countries from exercising independent discretionary monetary
policy. As a result, South Africa’s economic superiority over the LEN countries
is exerted through its sole discretion over monetary policy decisions in the region.
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is responsible for monetary policy for-
mulation and implementation with its local economy as their primary target. The
core assumption for this policy arrangement is that as long as the LEN currencies
are fixed to the ZAR and the SARB pursues a domestic policy of low and stable
inflation, policy effects will be transmitted from the South African economy to the
rest of the LEN countries without delay (Seleteng, 2016).
Following SARB’s adoption of an inflation rate targeting (IT) regime in 2000,
there have been growing debates among researchers on the efficacy of this pol-
icy instrument. Several studies in South Africa suggest that SARB’s inflation-
targeting framework is ineffective in restraining inflationary pressures within the
target range (Ikhide and Uanguta, 2010; Bonga-Bonga and Kabundi, 2015; Se-
leteng, 2016; Ajilore and Ikhide, 2013). For example, during the period from 2014
1Before 2018, Eswatini was known as Swaziland.
2to 2016, the SARB entered a contractionary phase when forecasts indicated that
inflation was expected to rise. These contractionary monetary policy episodes are
found to have negatively affected economic growth in South Africa, especially in
manufacturing production (Bonga-Bonga and Kabundi, 2015). There is a limited
number of research studies that extend this analysis to the LEN countries. Empir-
ically, it is still not understood how South Africa’s monetary policy decisions affect
the LEN economies and the channels through which these effects are transmitted.
The effect of monetary policy transmission on output, prices, investment, and
other key economic indicators has been subject to ongoing debates in monetary
economics. It has been widely observed that Monetary Policy Transmission Mech-
anism (MPTM) functions through various channels; namely, interest rate channel,
exchange rate channel, bank credit channel and equity price channel (Ireland, 2005;
Mishkin, 1995). Friedman (1968) stressed that the linkage between policy instru-
ments and their targets is essential to our understanding of what monetary policy
can accomplish. Without a clear idea of what is within reach of a central bank in
terms of controlling economic activity, it is not possible to make sensible choices
regarding monetary policy (Chatterjee, 2002).
Given the limited scope for monetary policy adjustment by the LEN countries,
it is crucial to understand how policy-induced changes are transmitted from South
Africa to the LEN countries for the following reasons. Firstly, a clear and func-
tional understanding of the monetary policy transmission mechanism may help
authorities and policymakers to precisely ascertain the relative effectiveness of the
channels to achieve policy targets. Secondly, since the financial sector in the LEN
countries is highly integrated with their South-African counterpart, adequate in-
formation about the mechanism may enable appropriate weights and emphasis to
be placed on monetary policy targets and goals during monetary policy design and
implementation. Finally, in the case where these channels do not optimally func-
tion for a member country, an adjustment mechanism such as liquidity manage-
ment may be implemented to restore the economy to equilibrium, thus correcting
3domestic liquidity imbalances.
This study addresses the gap in the literature on the CMA and its impact on
the LEN countries by comparatively evaluating the transmission of South Africa’s
monetary policy shocks in the Common Monetary Area. This study empirically
attempts to answer the questions: How do policy-induced changes affect macroeco-
nomic indicators in the CMA? How effectively does each member country respond
to these changes? We use a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) methodology
and impulse response functions (IRFs) to address these questions. In particular,
this paper assesses how economic output, inflation, narrow money supply, do-
mestic credit, lending rate spread across the CMA countries react to shocks in
the South African repo rate. Following the works of Ikhide and Uanguta (2010)
and Seleteng (2016), this study similarly identifies the South African repo rate
(henceforth referred to as, repo rate) as the relevant monetary policy instrument
of the CMA. Unlike previous studies in the CMA, this study uses monthly data
from February 2000 to December 2018 to better reflect the short-run dynamics
of monetary policy during the IT period. Monthly GDP data is estimated from
quarterly observations using the Chow-Lin (1971) regressions approach. The U.S.
federal reserve funds rate is included in the estimated model to control for changes
to domestic monetary policy due to external shocks following studies such as Kim
and Roubini (2000) and Aslanidi (2007).
The rest of the research paper is structured as follows: Chapter two presents
an overview of the CMA, the structure of the arrangement and unique features
of monetary policy for each member country. Chapter three provides a review of
the theoretical and empirical studies of MPTM in developed and emerging market
economies. Chapter four describes the data used in this study. This chapter also
presents the theoretical background of an SVAR model, empirical model specifi-
cation, and discusses time-series tests adopted. Chapter five provides the results
of this study. Chapter six provides the results of robustness tests. Chapter seven
discusses the implications of our findings and future research questions.
42 The Common Monetary Area
2.1 Historical Background
The origins of the CMA can be traced back to the establishment of the SARB
in 1921, which created a de facto currency union between Eswatini, Lesotho,
Namibia and South Africa (Collings, 1978; Wang et al., 2007). The South African
currency (initially the pound) was established as an exclusive regional medium
of exchange and legal tender in Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, and South Africa1.
Internal movement of capital within the region was not subject to any restrictions,
and all external transactions were executed through South African banks under
South African exchange control regulations. Following the end of World War
II, the ruling Nationalist Party in South Africa introduced major reforms that
culminated in isolation from Britain, and the introduction of a new currency,
the South African rand, in 1961. After Botswana, Eswatini, and Lesotho gained
independence, negotiations with South Africa began that resulted in the official
establishment of a currency union through the signing of the Rand Monetary Area
(RMA) in 1974. However, Botswana withdrew2 from the agreement a year later
due to concerns that membership in the RMA constituted loss of independent
monetary policy power (Metzger, 2004).
In 1986, the RMA was updated to create the current structure of the Com-
mon Monetary Area, which gave Lesotho and Eswatini the right to issue their
national currencies. Although Namibia was not formally a member of the CMA,
it has always been integrated into the CMA through South Africa (Metzger, 2004).
Namibia remained under South-Africa’s military occupation after it was invaded
during World War I and maintained this status until it became independent in
1During this period, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho were still under the British Colonial rule.
2However, Botswana is often called a de facto member of the current CMA because its
floating currency is pegged to a currency basket, with the South African rand accounting for an
estimated 60% - 70% of the weight (Wang et al., 2007).
51990. Subsequently, it joined the CMA in 1992, which marked the formation of
the current multilateral CMA arrangement. For more details about the history of
the region, refer to Appendix B.1, extracted from Wang et al. (2007).
2.2 Institutional Arrangements
Tjirongo (1995) and Wang et al. (2007) have comprehensively summarised the
structure of the CMA as follows3: Each of the four members has an independent
central bank, which is responsible for implementing policies and issuing national
currencies. The currencies of Lesotho (LSL), Eswatini (SZL), and Namibia (NAD)
have been pegged one to one with the South African Rand (ZAR). The ZAR is the
only currency that circulates as legal tender throughout the entire CMA region
while currencies of the rest of the members are restricted within their respective
borders. Individual LEN currencies and the ZAR are perfect substitutes, with
no conversion costs. In order to support the fixed exchange rate regime, LEN
countries are required to back their currency issues with foreign exchange reserves.
The reserves are kept in a common pool managed by SARB, and they can be made
available upon any member’s request. There are no restrictions to intra-CMA
funds transfers (capital or current transactions). However, all CMA members
apply a common exchange control system that is determined by the South African
authorities. The LEN currencies receive annual payments from South Africa to
compensate them for foregone seigniorage4. The amount of ZAR circulating in
the LEN countries is not directly measured; it is estimated. Van den Heever
(2010) estimated that the ZAR accounted for approximately 76 percent of the
total money in circulation in the LEN countries during the period between 2006
to 2007. However, the LEN countries do not include the ZAR when reporting the
total amount of money circulating within their countries.
The CMA countries, together with Botswana, belong to the Southern African
Customs Union (SADC), a regional trading block. Consequently, there is very high
3Refer to appendix B.2 for further details.
4Seigniorage refers to the profit made by the government of a country from issuing currency.
6capital and goods mobility among member countries in the CMA. This mobility
gives the LEN countries access to the South African financial markets. There is
also consultation among members that enhances policy implementation through
yearly meetings. However, there has been growing concerns in recent years in
the LEN countries about South Africa’s dominance in designing monetary policy
for the whole region (Metzger, 2004; Alweendo, 2000), concerns which, in part,
motivated this study.
2.3 Monetary Policy Framework
According to standard macroeconomics theory, monetary policy can be broadly
described as measures taken by the central bank to influence short-term interest
rates and the supply of money and credit to achieve a set of objectives (Mishkin,
2014). The short term interest rate refers mainly to the bank rate (the rate at
which the central bank lends to commercial banks), the repo rate (the rate at
which the central bank provides overnight liquidity for commercial banks) and the
inter-bank rate (the rate at which commercial banks borrow from each other). The
goal of central banks is to maintain a monetary policy which is neither excessive
(which may lead to an increase in inflation) nor deficient (which may lead to an
increase in unemployment).
Many countries have implemented a wide range of monetary policy strategies
that have successfully reduced inflation while maintaining relatively low levels of
unemployment (N’Diaye and Laxton, 2002). Inflation rate targeting (IT) is a
monetary policy strategy that has received growing recognition in both developed
and emerging market economies. According to a popular paper by Bernanke and
Mishkin (1997), IT policy requires the monetary authority to announce the numer-
ical inflation target. If inflation falls outside this target, the central bank should
use short-term interest rates to restore inflation within the target range. Another
common monetary policy strategy that uses a nominal anchor to promote price
stability is exchange-rate targeting. Mishkin (2014) has pointed out that the mod-
ern approach to exchange-rate targeting involves fixing the value of the domestic
7currency to a large, low-inflation anchor country. This strategy is particularly
useful for small market economies because the anchor country directly contributes
to the goal of price stability.
In the pursuit for price stability, central banks are confronted by a problem
known as the policy trilemma (Mishkin, 2014). This hypothesis states that a
country can simultaneously choose any two, but not all of the following three
policy goals: free capital mobility, fixed exchange rate, and sovereign monetary
policy (Mishkin, 2014). Figure 2.1 illustrates that a country can only choose one
out of the three options. For example, a country that chooses option one will
have capital mobility and independent monetary policy, e.g. the United States
and South Africa. In the second option, a country gives up monetary policy in
exchange for free movement of capital and price stability, e.g. the LEN countries.
The third option is chosen by a country that pursues independent monetary policy
and has a fixed exchange rate, e.g. China.
Figure 2.1: The Open-economy Policy Trilemma
Source: Mishkin (2014, p. 439)
The institutional arrangement of the CMA discussed in the previous section
suggests that the LEN countries have surrendered their independent monetary
policy to South Africa. The LEN countries must, therefore, set their interest
rates within a close range to those in South Africa. Failure to follow interest
rate movements in South Africa may lead to distortion to the fixed exchange
rate (Alweendo, 2000). For example, if South Africa pursued a contractionary
8monetary policy and increased the repo rate, this will result to lower expected
inflation in South Africa thus causing the ZAR to appreciate relative to the LEN
currencies5. This can be represented by an increase in the demand for ZAR assets,
as shown in figure 2.2. When the repo rate increases, the relative expected returns
on South African assets increases and the demand curve shifts from D1 to D2. The
equilibrium exchange rate between the ZAR and the LEN currencies increases from
1 to E1. In response, the LEN countries could sell the ZAR and buy their domestic
currency in order to keep their currencies from depreciating. However, this policy
action would lead to a continuing decline in their (LEN) international reserves,
until the LEN countries are forced to devalue their currencies against the ZAR.
Therefore the LEN countries can no longer control their monetary policy because
movements in their interest rates are determined by movements in South Africa’s
repo rate.
Exchange Rate ZAR/LEN





Figure 2.2: Foreign exchange market response to repo rate changes
Policymakers in the LEN countries have undertaken various policy measures
in attempts to bolster their local economies. However, these efforts to re-focus
domestic monetary policy to domestic developments in the LEN have been unsuc-
cessful (Ikhide and Uanguta, 2010). The scope for implementation of monetary
policy in the CMA and the recent developments are reviewed below.
5An important assumption here is that nothing else was changed other than the repo rate.
92.3.1 South Africa
The CMA arrangement provides the SARB with a wider range of monetary policy
options relative to the rest of the members. Consequently, monetary policy instru-
ments implemented in South Africa have implications for the rest of the CMA.
Before 2000, the SARB operated under an eclectic approach to monetary policy,
where growth in money supply and credit extension were used as intermediate
guidelines for short term interest rates. However, this policy was not transparent
and sometimes questionable actions were taken that were costly to the domestic
economic growth (Aron and Muellbauer, 2007). The inflation targeting approach
was adopted to enhance policy transparency, accountability and predictability.
Under South African IT framework, the appropriate measure of inflation was iden-
tified as CPIX (CPI less mortgage interest rates) which is specifically maintained
within a target range of 3 to 6 percent6. The repo rate remains the main oper-
ational tool for maintaining price stability. The adoption of the IT framework
marked the SARB’s shift to a floating exchange rate regime to ensure the com-
petitiveness of South-Africa’s exports. However, the IT approach in South Africa
has been experiencing a decline in efficiency over time, as evidenced by the failure
of high interest rates to keep inflation within the target range (Meyer, De Jongh,
and Van Wyngaard, 2018). Other related studies suggest that SARB’s inflation
target range is very low for conducive economic growth in the LEN countries. For
instance, Mosikari and Eita (2018) estimates that the optimal level of inflation for
Eswatini is 12 percent, while Seleteng (2005) estimated 10 percent for Lesotho.
This suggests that the SARB’s policies which lower inflation to the target band
may have a negative impact on the LEN economies. In recent years following the
2008 global financial crisis, the SARB added a complementary mandate to oversee
and maintain financial stability, which to some extent may influence the effect of
monetary policy not only in South Africa but throughout the rest of the CMA.
6According to the South African Constitution, the inflation target is determined by the
Minister of Finance in consultation with the SARB. The choice of policy instruments used to
achieve this target is solely in the discretion of the bank (Coco and Viegi, 2019).
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2.3.2 Eswatini
Before 1995, the Central bank of Eswatini (CBE) had adopted an interest rate
policy that was independent of conditions in South-Africa. This was done in
part as an effort to encourage investment by providing cheaper capital. After
South Africa became a democratic state in 1994, the attractiveness of Eswatini
as an investment hub for South African firms shifted (Wang et al., 2007). The
decline in investment, coupled with the effects of prolonged drought, was followed
by a period of low GDP growth. In response, the CBE introduced new policy
measures that aim to reduce the interest rate differential between Eswatini and
South Africa. In this policy framework, the CBE uses the central bank rate as a
major policy instrument to counter inflationary pressures and curb capital flight
(Central Bank of Swaziland, 2017). This rate can be set at par with that in South
Africa or at slightly different levels depending on the domestic economic situation.
In addition, CBE also uses other policy instruments such as liquidity and reserve
requirements to promote price and financial stability. However, the effectiveness of
these instruments is shrouded by excess liquidity in the domestic banking system
and the lack of highly liquid financial products (Ikhide and Uanguta, 2010). As a
result, domestic commercial banks tend to manage their funds through high yield
financial markets in South Africa. Therefore, the CBE cannot effectively use bank
rates to influence domestic money market rates. The central bank rate effectively
serves as an economic indicator for the level of interest rate rather a benchmark
for lending.
2.3.3 Lesotho
According to Alweendo (2000), the Central Bank of Lesotho’s (CBL) approach to
monetary policy before 1998 was primarily through direct and indirect manipu-
lation of interest rates. The deposit rate and lending rates in Lesotho were set
slightly lower relative to South Africa. Commercial banks were also subject to
Minimum Local Assets Ratio (MLAR), which was intended to attract domestic
investment for development projects. After 1998 this policy was gradually phased
11
out, and commercial banks were then allowed to determine their lending and sav-
ings deposit rate. The MLAR was replaced by the Liquid Assets Ratio (LAR).
This is because commercial banks are risk-averse and prefer to keep their deposits
with the central bank rather than providing credit to the private sector. Introduc-
tion of treasury bill auctions has been a recent attempt to curb excess liquidity
within the banking sector in Lesotho (Ikhide and Uanguta, 2010). This advance-
ment is expected to offer competitive investments and hence prevent excessive
capital outflows7. In addition, the CBL also introduced a new bank rate which is
intended to provide institutional lenders with a reference when determining their
rates. The results of these policy changes have not been effective at narrowing
the interest rate gap between Lesotho and South Africa. Lending rates in Lesotho
are still higher than those in South Africa, while deposit rates in South Africa are
higher than in Lesotho (Ikhide and Uanguta, 2010; The Economist, 2015).
2.3.4 Namibia
As the last member to join the CMA, the Bank of Namibia (BON) has had to
undertake considerable efforts to catch up with its fellow members in terms of
policy implementation (Tjirongo, 1995). BON was established in 1990, following
Namibia’s independence from South Africa. Namibia’s economic dependence on
South Africa meant that moving forward after independence, additional measures
had to be taken to ensure stability and confidence in the economic and financial
systems (Kalenga, 2001). The BON views the reserve requirement as a crucial
policy instrument for influencing economic activity in Namibia (Alweendo, 2000).
The central bank rate is also used to control domestic inflation, similar to Eswatini
and Lesotho, but this only acts as a reference point for interest rates in Namibia.
The BON has developed other policy innovations such as the call account facility
which enables commercial banks to place funds with the BON at an interest rate
below the Bank rate. This facility enables commercial banks to overdraw their
7If left unchecked, capital outflows put pressure on the net international reserves, which in
turn may threaten the exchange rate peg (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2019).
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account held with the BON. There is, however, limited effectiveness of these policy
instruments to influence the economy. For instance, open market operations have
a limited effect on the overall economy since a large share of treasuries/stocks are
owned by institutional investors (Bank of Namibia, 2008).
The above discussion on the structure and monetary policy framework in the
CMA explains why a fixed exchange rate requires the LEN countries to give up
independent control of monetary policy. South Africa is, therefore, responsible
for monetary policy formulation and implementation in the region. In order to
understand the impact of South Africa’s monetary policy stance in the LEN coun-
tries, insights from the experiences of other countries engaged in similar regional




The nature of monetary policy transmission mechanisms is a concern for countries
in the establishment of a currency union. Understanding the transmission mech-
anism enables the selection of policy instruments that result in symmetric out-
comes for all member countries. Monetary policy transmission mechanism defines
the reaction of real variables (such as GDP and employment) to policy-induced
changes in the nominal money stock or short-term nominal interest rate (Ireland,
2005). There are mainly four channels of monetary policy transmission recognized
by economists, namely; interest rate channel, exchange rate channel, bank credit
channel and equity price channel. However, there are different views on the rele-
vance and significance of these channels, hence, there is less agreement about the
way monetary policy exerts its influence on the real sector of the economy1. Given
the complexity of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, a useful way to
understand the efficacy of monetary policy is to isolate the central bank’s policy
actions and the transmission mechanisms through which those actions work their
effect (Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002).
This research paper focuses specifically on the interest rate channel of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism. The interest rate channel is the tra-
ditional mechanism and often considered the main channel of monetary policy
transmission (Taylor, 1995; Loayza and Schmidt-Hebber, 2002). Hicks (1937) in-
troduced the model that explains the linkage between money and the interest rate
to aggregate income. The predictive power of the model relies on a set of core
assumptions. Ndubuisi (2015) suggests that the following assumptions are crucial
in understanding how the interest rate channel functions:
1See Twinoburyo and Odhiambo (2018) for a summary of the recent literature.
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(i) The central bank directly and perfectly controls money supply, outside money2,
and/or the short-term rates: This enables the central bank to make credible
policies that can impact the policy instruments and the effects transmitted
to the economy.
(ii) There are no perfect substitutes to the central bank’s monetary policy in-
struments: Since central banks frequently affect the markets through open
market operations, other agents must lack the ability to offset them to cause
desired changes on the monetary base.
(iii) Nominal rigidities: Nominal variables are assumed sticky due to imperfect
competition in price and wage setting. This implies that firms are subject
to some constraints on the frequency of adjustment to changes in prices of
goods and services they sell. Sticky prices ensure that the nominal and real
interest rates do not contemporaneously rise with an increase in the money
supply.
(iv) Expectation hypothesis of the interest rate term structure: This assumption
establishes a link between the interest rate and different returns on securities.
Market participants are assumed to have expectations about this and hence
link the short term rates to the long term rates.
In the study of the effects of money on economic activity, two approaches have
been developed: reduced models and structural models. On the one hand, Key-
nesian economists use structural models to examine how money affects economic
activity within a model which explains the behaviours of consumers and firms. If
the model is appropriately specified, then each transmission channel can be evalu-
ated separately and hence the effect of institutional changes (financial innovations,
regulations) can be estimated. In the traditional Keynesian view, the transmission
of a contractionary monetary policy to the real economy is explained as follows
(Mishkin, 1995):
M ↓ =⇒ i ↑ =⇒ I ↓ =⇒ Y ↓
2This axiom is hardly met in reality due to the actions and inactions of banks and non-banks.
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A contractionary monetary policy (M ↓) will cause an increase in real interest
rates (i ↑). This will cause an increase in the cost of capital, and thus a decline
in investment (I ↓)3. Ultimately, this process will end with a decline in aggregate
demand and output (Y ↓).
On the other hand, monetarists use reduced models to analyze the effect of
money on economic activities by checking the relationship between output (Y )
and money (M ) in an economy where it is like a "black box" and inside of it
cannot be seen (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Mishkin, 2014).
M =⇒ Black Box =⇒ Y
If a tight monetary policy is applied, there will be an increase in the short-term
nominal interest rates, which in turn increases long-term nominal interest rates.
This is due to investor attempts to arbitrage away differences in the risk-adjusted
expected returns on debt instruments of various maturities. This phenomenon
can be explained by the expectation hypothesis of the interest rate term structure
(Gedikli, 2017). As nominal prices and wages (both assumed rigid) gradually
self-adjust, movements in nominal interest rates are transferred into movements
in real interest rates. Consequently, firms will prefer to decrease their investment
expenditure due to the increasing cost of borrowing. Likewise, households also
reduce their spending on durable goods due to rising real cost of borrowing. A
combination of these changes will result in the reduction of aggregate output and
domestic inflation.
3Households’ decisions about housing, and durable consumer expenditures are also included
as investment decisions.
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Figure 3.1: Monetary policy transmission mechanism in the CMA
Source: Bank of Namibia, and Central Bank of Eswatini
Figure 3.1 shows a schematic illustration of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism in the CMA. Due to their relatively small size, the LEN countries
import a large amount of their inflation from South Africa since it is their largest
trading partner (Bank of Namibia, 2008; Wang et al., 2007). For example, if the
SARB suspects there is excess liquidity in the South African markets, it increases
the repo rate to create shortages. Commercial banks in the CMA respond by
increasing their lending rates to reflect the increased cost of borrowing. This will
decrease the demand for money and ultimately, the total demand. Consequently,
the price levels will decrease as total spending declines.
3.2 Empirical literature
Following Sims (1980), it has become common for economists to estimate the
effects of monetary policy on the real economy using vector autoregressive (VAR)
models (Aslanidi, 2007). This approach treats all the variables in the system as
endogenous, thus, solving the problem of bi-directional effects the variables can
have on each other. Also, the VAR enables the study of the impact of monetary
policy on the real economy without imposing structural restrictions on the model
of the economy (Kim and Roubini, 2000). However, one of the major criticisms
against VAR models is the ordering of variables. In order to recover monetary
policy shocks from the VAR residuals, the Cheloskey decomposition is used. The
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Cheloskey method orders the variables in a particular sequence such that only
variables placed higher in the sequence have a contemporaneous effect on the
variables placed lower in the ordering. Zha (1997) argued that VAR might not
be appropriate to identify the relationship between policy instruments and money
market variables. This is because, in reality, monetary instruments and financial
variables can have a contemporaneous effect on variables placed higher in the
sequence.
Structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models have been alternatively used
to identify structural shocks of monetary policy. This approach relaxes the as-
sumptions of the VAR models. SVAR models allow for contemporaneous relations
between monetary policy variables and financial variables. The SVAR derives its
name from the fact that it is a vector autoregressive model generated by an eco-
nomic model ("structure"). The SVAR approach emerged from seminal works of
Blanchard and Watson (1984), Cooley and Leroy (1985), Bernanke (1986), and
Sims (1986). These authors used theoretically motivated restrictions to estimate
structural parameters and identify structural shocks. For example, Blanchard and
Watson (1984) used economic theory to impose short-run restrictions in order to
investigate the influence of shocks on the business cycle. An SVAR model is useful
in estimating monetary policy shocks because they allow one to impose theoret-
ically motivated restrictions on the relationship between variables. This study,
thus, uses the SVAR methodology.
This section reviews the empirical studies on macroeconomic effects of mon-
etary policy shocks. Given the lack of a unified view on how monetary policy
transmission mechanism functions, several research techniques have been adopted
to estimate the effect of monetary policy on price levels, output, domestic credit,
wages, money money and exchange rate using different monetary policy instru-
ments (Ishioro, 2013). It is important for the reader to note that there is a very
limited number of studies that extend this body of work to the CMA region, es-
pecially in the LEN countries. As a result, closely related literature focusing on
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other regions is also reviewed to improve comparison and provide context to the
current study.
3.2.1 Developed Economies
Some empirical studies that focus on developed countries that have contributed to
the debate on the effect of monetary policy on the real economy include Leeper,
Sims, and Zha (1996) who used an SVAR framework that allows for the contempo-
raneous impact of monetary policy on target variables. The study investigated the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the United States using monthly
data from 1959 to 1996. The study asserts that monetary policy shocks do not
cause large changes in output, but they have a stronger effect on prices. The au-
thors argue, therefore, that the observed relationship between high interest rates
and low output is not caused by contractionary policy but by high inflationary
pressure instead.
Peersman and Smets (2001) applied an identified VAR model to analyse the
macroeconomic effects of unexpected monetary policy shocks in the Euro area
using data from 1980 to 1998. The results showed that an unexpected positive
shock to the interest rate tends to be followed by a temporary decline in output
and a real appreciation of the exchange rate. Prices were found to be sticky as
they raised with a lag several quarters later. This result is known as the "price
puzzle". This is a case where price levels rise in response to monetary tightening,
rather than fall (Kim and Roubini, 2000). Smets and Wouters (2003) used DSGE
models combined with Bayesian methods of inference and found evidence of the
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission in the Euro area.
Arestis and Sawyer (2003) argues that a "new" approach to monetary policy
emerged that identifies interest rate policy rather than the stock of money. As
a result, the paper focuses on the transmission of monetary policy through the
interest rate channel in the Eurozone, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The results of the study argue that a sequence of effects from the reserve bank
discount rate to the final target of the rate of inflation is long and uncertain.
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Also, the relationship between the exchange rate and interest rate expressed in the
interest rate parity approach have constraints on the degree to which the domestic
interest rate can be set to address the domestic levels of aggregate demand and
inflation. The results suggest that there is a relatively weak effect of interest
rate changes on inflation. Based on these findings, the authors conclude that
monetary policy can have long-run effects on real magnitudes. This, however,
does not comfortably fit with the theoretical basis of the new monetary policy
approach.
In Japan, Iwata and Wu (2006) investigated the impact of exogenous monetary
shocks when nominal rates are at zero. They used a nonlinear structural VAR
model to examine the impact the zero bound constraint on the effectiveness of
counter-cyclical monetary policies. The findings were that when interest rates
are near zero, the output effect of exogenous shocks to monetary policy is cut by
up to 50 percent if the central bank continues to target the interest rate. The
conditional impulse response functions were used to isolate the effect of monetary
policy shocks operating through the interest rate channel when other possible
channels of monetary transmission are present. Their results confirmed that the
interest channel is the most important mechanism of monetary policy transmission.
The reviewed literature from industrialised countries suggests that researchers
have not yet reached a consensus about the impact of monetary policy on macroe-
conomic variables. An important lesson drawn from these studies is that appro-
priate control for exogenous shocks is useful for avoiding the price puzzle. Earlier
research such as Peersman and Smets (2001) and Arestis and Sawyer (2003) have
encountered this puzzling dynamic response. Kim and Roubini (2000) suggested
that incorporating foreign variables in the model may help to resolve this puzzle.
3.2.2 Emerging Market Economies
Following the debates on monetary policy transmission mechanism in the U.S.
and other developed countries, similar studies have been conducted in developing
countries. Economic conditions of developing countries in the sub-Saharan Africa
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region are comparable as most countries in this region are low income with weak
institutions (Twinoburyo and Odhiambo, 2018). Notable studies in the region
include Cheng (2006) who applied both recursive and non-recursive SVAR model
to monthly data in Kenya for the period 1997 to 2005. The findings showed
that a contractionary monetary policy leads to an initial increase in the price
level, followed by a statistically significant decline for a period of about two years
following the shock. The response to a contractionary monetary policy was an
initial rise in output but eventually falls. However, the decline is not statistically
significant. Shocks to the interest rate were found to explain a much larger fraction
of inflation than output. The authors concluded that there is evidence of exchange
rate pass-through to inflation given that positive shocks to interest rates lead
initially to an exchange rate depreciation, but eventually appreciates for about
two years.
Mirdala (2009) estimated an SVAR model for the countries from the Visegrád
Group4 to analyze the sources of movements in real output for the period from
1999 to 2008. The findings revealed that a positive monetary policy shock has a
high impact on the real output variability, which implies that the real output is
sensitive to changes in monetary policy. The estimated impact of nominal shocks
on real output was mixed across countries. For some countries, nominal shocks
caused a decrease in output while for some countries, positive nominal shocks
caused an increase in output.
Buigut (2009) estimated a three-variable recursive VAR for three East African
Community (EAC)5 countries using data from the period 1984 to 2006. The paper
explored the importance of the interest channel in the region. The main finding
is that the interest rate transmission mechanism is weak in all three countries. A
shock to the interest rate has no statistically significant effect on either inflation
or real output. However, Davoodi, Dixit, and Pinter (2013) argued that these
4The Visegrád group consists of four Central European states: Cyprus, Malta, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia.
5The author focused on Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
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findings are biased by several factors: (i) The study uses a sample that includes
too few observations for empirical analyses, resulting in few degrees of freedom;
(ii) it includes periods of substantial changes in monetary policy implementation,
financial deepening, and other structural shifts in each economy which may have
contributed to large uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Davoodi, Dixit, and Pinter (2013) proposed that using a Bayesian VAR model
could resolve these issues because it provides an effective way of dealing with of
over-parameterization. In contrast, their results found that an expansionary mon-
etary increases prices significantly in Kenya and Uganda and output in Burundi,
Kenya, and Rwanda.
Evidence from the selected studies in the sub-Saharan Africa region has moti-
vated this study as follows: Monthly data from February 2000 to December 2018
is used to ensure that there are sufficient observations for econometric estimation.
In the case of GDP (which is only available on a quarterly frequency), this study
uses the Chow-Lin (1971) approach to estimate monthly frequency. This study
will also incorporate robustness tests to ensure that structural breaks in the data
have been sufficiently controlled.
3.2.3 Common Monetary Area
Only two studies that compare the effect of South-Africa’s monetary policy con-
duct on the economies of the CMA countries were found in the literature. Ikhide
and Uanguta (2010) and Seleteng (2016) examined the impact of SARB’s mone-
tary policy on the LEN economies using a VAR framework. Seleteng (2016) used
annual data from 1980 to 2012 while Ikhide and Uanguta (2010) used monthly
data6. These studies focused on how changes in the SARB’s monetary policy in-
strument (repo rate) affects money supply, credit and prices in the CMA and thus
evaluating the ability of the LEN economies to undertake independent monetary
policy under the prevalent structure. Both studies found statistically significant
results that lending rates and price levels were instantaneously sensitive to changes
6Ikhide and Uanguta (2010) did not disclose the period under study.
22
in the repo rate. However, Ikhide and Uanguta (2010) also found that money sup-
ply is instantaneously responsive to the repo rate, while Seleteng (2016) did not
find any significant relationship. These significant differences may be attributed
to several factors such as the difference in the period under study, specification
of the model and structural breaks. Ikhide and Uanguta (2010) confirmed that
the repo rate is a relevant policy instrument in the LEN economies. Both studies
concluded that the LEN countries are not capable of independent monetary policy
given the nature of their agreement with South-Africa.
There are also country-focused studies that have attempted to disentangle the
transmission of monetary policy in the CMA. For example, Gumata, Kabundi,
and Ndou (2013) investigated the presence of different MPTM channels in South
Africa using a Large Bayesian VAR model with quarterly data from the period
1990Q1 to 2012Q2. Their results showed that credit, interest rate, asset prices,
exchange rate, and expectations channels are all potent in the South African econ-
omy, but differ in magnitudes. The study concluded that the interest rate channel
was the most important transmitter of monetary policy shocks. Bonga-Bonga
(2010) examined the responses of the short and long-term interest rates to mon-
etary, demand and supply shocks in South-Africa using data from 1986 to 2007.
The empirical analysis conducted in this study followed an SVAR methodology
with long-run restrictions. The author found that the effects of monetary policy
shocks caused the short and long-term interest rates to move in the same direction.
However, the short-run and long-run interest rates move in different directions in
the presence of positive supply shocks.
Mkhonta (2018) used a panel fixed effects approach to ascertain the impact of
the discount rate differential between the Eswatini and Namibian rates and the
South Africa rates. Quarterly data from the period 2010Q1 to 2015Q4 was used.
The results suggest that the interest rate differential is statistically insignificant in
affecting investments in both countries. However, when an indicator of financial
development is included, the results improve. Therefore, the authors argue that
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financial developments are crucial in Eswatini and Namibia in order to enhance
the efficacy of monetary policy.
In Namibia, Sheefeni and Ocran (2012) used an SVAR methodology with long-
run restrictions to investigate how interest rate channel of monetary policy trans-
mission affects prices and output in Namibia. The authors used quarterly data for
the period from 1993 to 2009. The results revealed that short term interest rates
have an effect on domestic output and price levels. The authors concluded that
the presence of the interest rate channel suggests that the Bank of Namibia might
be able to influence long-term rates through open market operations. Dlamini and
Skosana (2017) similarly used an SVAR approach to provide evidence of the link-
age between monetary policy and selected macroeconomic variables in Eswatini.
The study used monthly data from 1990 to 2015. The findings showed the exis-
tence of a weak monetary policy transmission in the interest rate channel, credit
channel, and asset price channel.
The reviewed literature from the CMA shows that most studies examined
the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the CMA using VAR or SVAR
models. These studies included data from the period before and after the inflation
targeting regime was adopted. The selected studies reveal mixed results regarding
the effectiveness of monetary policy in the CMA. Some studies found a causal
relationship from monetary policy instruments to macroeconomic variables (Ikhide
and Uanguta, 2010; Seleteng, 2016; Sheefeni and Ocran, 2012) while others found
that monetary policy is ineffective (Mkhonta, 2018; Dlamini and Skosana, 2017).
Our study follows the recommendations of Blanchard and Watson (1984), amongst
others, to identify monetary policy shocks in the CMA using an SVAR approach.
Although the results may not change drastically, this paper will explore where
structural identification will help to address the inconsistencies in the literature.
Unlike previous studies in the CMA, data used in this study focuses on the period
after the inflation targeting regime was adopted, following Davoodi, Dixit, and
Pinter (2013). This approach will ensure that the estimated results are consistent
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since the monetary policy transmission mechanism is sensitive to structural shifts.
Most of the reviewed studies did not incorporate any controls for external changes
that may influence the implementation of monetary poly in the CMA. The U.S.
federal funds rate will be included in the estimated model to control for exogenous




This study uses monthly time series data for the period 2000M2 to 2018M12, for
four member countries of the CMA: Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa
(227 observations for each country). Macroeconomic data for individual coun-
tries were sourced from reports from the South African Reserve Bank, Central
Bank of Lesotho, Bank of Namibia, and Central Bank of Eswatini. Missing data
was complemented with reports from the International Monetary Fund’s Interna-
tional Financial Statistics. Following Ikhide and Uanguta (2010), Seleteng (2016),
and Famoroti and Tipoy (2019), data on the following variables were gathered;
economic output (lgdp), inflation1 (lcpi), narrow money supply2 (lm1 ), domestic
credit (ldm), and lending rate spread (lrs). All of these variables, except economic
output, were obtained at a monthly frequency. A statistical approach described
in section 4.1.1 was adopted to interpolate monthly GDP from observed quarterly
data. A description of the variables and abbreviations is provided in appendix
7. Consistent with past studies, (Bernanke, 1986: Ikhide and Uanguta, 2010;
Davoodi, Dixit, and Pinter, 2013) for example, the following variables have been
log-transformed: money supply, inflation, domestic credit, economic output.
4.2 Temporal Disaggregation
One of the challenges that researchers have to address is the lack of macroeconomic
data (such as GDP, Inflation rates) at desired frequencies (quarterly, monthly).
Several temporal disaggregation methods have been developed in recent years
to address this problem. Temporal disaggregation is a process of estimating a
high-frequency time series data using low-frequency data (Sax and Steiner, 2013).
1Indexed such that CPI2010M06 = 100.
2For the LEN countries, M1 does not include the estimated amount of ZAR circulating their
respective countries.
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These methods can generally be classified into two categories; a) models based on
an indicator series, e.g. Chow-Lin (1971) and Litterman (1983), and b) models
developed without an indicator, e.g. Denton (1971). These techniques are partic-
ularly useful in this analysis because in estimating an SVAR model, all variables
must have the same frequency.
4.2.1 The Chow-Lin Approach
The temporal disaggregation procedure adopted in this paper was developed by
Chow and Lin (1971). It is commonly referred to as the best linear unbiased
estimator (BLUE) because it uses a regression approach that relates the unknown
frequency series to a set of known high-frequency series.
Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that we have annual values of n
years of a given time series ya, the goal is to disaggregate ya into a quarterly series
yˆq with 4n observations. The Chow-Lin approach to this problem is based on xq,
some observed quarterly indicator related to ya. The relationship between the
disaggregated series and the indicator is,
Yˆq = Xqβ + εq (4.1)
where Yˆq is a (4n× 1) vector of the estimated quarterly series, Xq is the vector
(n × 1) of observed quarterly series, β is the vector of unknown parameters and
is estimated using the Generalised Least Square (GLS) method, ε is vector of
stochastic disturbances with mean, E(ε) = 0 and covariance E(εε′) = σ2I = Vq,
σ2 is a constant. The Chow-Lin can be adopted to our case in the following three
steps:
Step 1: Finding an Aggregation Matrix
Since Yˆq is a high frequency matrix of the unobserved series, the Chow-Lin ap-
proach transforms model (4.1) into a low frequency matrix of the observed series
Ya. This is achieved by pre-multiplying equation (4.1) by the aggregation matrix
C = c′⊗ In such that Ya = CYˆq, where c′ = [1, 1, 1, 1] and ⊗ denotes the kronecker
product. The result of the aggregated model is,
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Ya = Xaβ + εa (4.2)
where Xa = CXq, εa = Cεq is the vector of aggregated disturbances with mean
E(εa) = CE(εq) = 0 and covariance E(εaε′a) = σ2CIC ′ = Va. β describes the
parameters that characterize the relationship between Ya and Xa.
Step 2: Finding the Chow-Lin disaggregation equation
The next step is to establish the equation to disaggregate annual data to quarterly
estimates. The optimal coefficient is determined by applying the GLS estimation








In order to find the Chow-Lin equation that disaggregates annual data to
quarterly data, we follow from equation (4.2) where εa = Cεq. We can re-write εq








Equations (4.3) and (4.4) can be substituted into (4.1) to give the Chow-Lin
equation that disaggregates annual data to quarterly estimates as shown below,






Step 3: Estimating the Covariance matrix under Chow-Lin Assumptions
A major drawback of the Chow-Lin approach is that the covariance matrix Vq is
unknown. Chow-Lin (1971) proposed two assumptions under which Vq could be
better estimated, which are
i. the disturbances are not serially correlated, each with variance σ2, then
Vq = σ
2I
ii. the quarterly disturbances εq, follow a simple autoregressive structure of first
order, AR(1) as,
εt = ρεt−1 + µt |ρ| < 1 ∀ t (4.6)
where ut is the white noise process; µ ∼ i.i.d(0, σ2µ), E(µt) = 0 and E(µ2t ) = σ2.
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To estimate the autoregressive parameter ρ, Chow-Lin (1971) suggested a poly-
nomial that needs to be solved3. If a sufficient length of quarterly data is available,
then one may estimate ρ from the OLS residuals of equation (4.1).
In this study, where the objective is to generate monthly GDP estimates from
quarterly aggregates, if the monthly residuals follow an autoregressive parameter,
then the first order auto-correlation of the quarterly residuals forms a polyno-
mial expression in the autoregressive coefficient of the monthly residuals (Karan,
2013). Therefore, a process similar to the GLS can be constructed to obtain results
implied by equations (4.4) and (4.6).
4.2.2 Estimating Monthly GDP
The data used in this estimation procedure is from the period from February 2000
to December 2018. The exports of goods and services were identified as a suitable
indicator for economic growth. A visual inspection shown in figure 4.1 shows that
exports generally exhibit co-movements with GDP.
Figure 4.1: Graphical inspection of the GDP proxy
Source: Author’s own contribution
3The following polynomial needs to be solved, ρˆa =
ρ+1)(ρ2+1)2
2(ρ2+ρ+2) where ρˆa is the estimated
first-order autocorrelation coefficient from the OLS residuals of the annual-data regression (4.2)
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The results of the monthly economic output series estimated using Chow-Lin
(1971) are shown in figure 4.2. The results show that the estimated monthly GDP
exhibits similar movements to the quarterly data for all countries. The results
also show larger volatility for South Africa starting from the period around 2008.
These patterns could be explained by changes observed in figure 4.1 during the
same period. Since South Africa and Namibia are the largest exporters in the
CMA, the effects of the external shocks will be greater compared to Lesotho and
Eswatini.
Figure 4.2: Estimated monthly GDP, 2000M2 - 2018M12
4.3 Unit Root Tests
The Classical regression model assumptions require both the independent and de-
pendent variables to be stationary, and that the errors must have a zero mean
and finite variance. However, many economics and financial time series data dis-
play trending behaviour or non-stationarity in the mean (Zivot and Wang, 2005).
A stochastic data generating process yt is said to be stationary if it has time-
invariant mean and variance. That is, the time-series generated by a stationary
stochastic process fluctuates around a constant mean and does not trend. Non-
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stationarity results in spurious regressions that are characterized by high R2, and
t and F-statistics that appear to be significant but the results do not have any
economic interpretation (Lütkepohl, 2005). Unit root tests have hence been de-
veloped to guide decisions whether trending data should be differenced first or
regressed on deterministic functions of time to render the data stationary. The
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is the most commonly used method for test-
ing unit root. The null hypothesis under the ADF test is that Yt is I(1) against
the alternative that it is I(0). The ADF test is based on estimating the following
test regression,
∆Yt = µ+ φYt−1 +
p∑
i=1
ψi∆Yt−i + εt (4.7)
where p is the lagged difference terms, its value is set so that the error εt
is serially uncorrelated. The error term is also assumed to be homoskedastic.
The null hypothesis of ADF is φ = 0 (non-stationarity) against the alternative
hypothesis of φ < 0 (stationarity).
However, relative caution is required when dealing with time-series data. The
ADF test is often found to be biased towards accepting the null hypothesis (H0)
and thus require further affirmation. This is because; a) it has very low power
against I(0) alternatives that are very close to being I(1), b) its power diminishes
as deterministic terms are added to the test of regression (Sheefeni and Ocran,
2012). The Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test is therefore used
to complement the ADF test because of its efficiency and superior power. The
KPSS can distinguish highly persistent stationary processes from non-stationary
processes very well. In the KPSS test, the null hypothesis is stationary, and the
alternative hypothesis is non-stationary. KPSS test is based on estimating the
following test regression,
Yt = Xt + εt and Xt = Xt−1 + µt (4.8)
where εt is the error term. The KPSS statistic is based on the residuals from




Shrestha and Bhatta (2017) propose that non stationary variables that are inte-
grated of the same order should be tested for cointegration. Two variables are
said to be cointegrated if they are each unit root processes, but their linear com-
bination is stationary. In other words, cointegration between two variables exists
if they have a long-run relationship. This study follows the Johansen (1988) and
Johansen and Juselius (1990) approach to cointegration. Johansen cointegration
test is based on the relationship between the rank of a matrix and its characteristic
roots. The generalised model with n variable vectors can be written as
Yt = A1Yt−1 + εt (4.9)
subtracting Yt−1 from both sides, we get
∆Yt = A1Yt−1 − Yt−1 + εt
= (A1 − I)Yt−1 + εt
= ΠYt−1 + εt
(4.10)
where Yt−1 and εt are (n × 1) vectors, Π is a (n × n) matrix. If rank of
Π = k then the series is stationary and if rank of Π < k, also known as reduced
rank, then there exists cointegration. The trace test tests the null hypothesis of k
cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of n.
4.5 Model Specification
This paper adopts an SVAR approach to trace the impact of shocks on the repo
rate on selected macroeconomic variables in Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia. The
strength of this model lies in the use of forecast error variance decomposition to
quantify the average contribution of a given structural shock to the variability of
the data over time. Structural VAR model is a multivariate, linear representation
of a vector of observable variables lagged on itself. Let n be the number of endoge-
nous variables in the model, following (Bernanke, 1986; Kim and Roubini, 2000;






AiYt−i +BXt + εt
Yt = A1Yt−1 + · · ·+ ApYt−p +BXt + εt
(4.11)
where Yt is an (n × 1) vector of endogenous variables observed at time t. Xt
is a vector of exogenous variables. Ai is an (n× n) vector of coefficient estimates,
εt is an (n × 1) vector of of serially uncorrelated reduced form disturbances, and








ΓiYt−i + ΠXt + µt
= Γ1Yt−1 + · · ·+ ΓpYt−p + ΠXt + µt
(4.12)
where Γ0 is the contemporaneous coefficients matrix with the diagonal ele-
ments normalized to equal one but the off-diagonal elements may be arbitrary. Γi
represents the matrices of the parameters of the economic variables, and µt repre-








0 Γi, B = Γ
−1
0 Π, and µt = Γ0εt (4.13)
Likewise, the variance-covariance matrix relationship between reduced and




The reduced form can be estimated using OLS, and point estimates of the
parameters (Ai) and variance-covariance matrix (ϕ) can be found. However, iden-
tifying restrictions have to be imposed to recover the structural form parameters.
The estimates for ϑ and the parameters in the structural form representation
can be obtained only through the estimates of ϕ. The matrix ϑ has n(n + 1)
parameters to be estimated, while ϕ contains only n(n + 1)/2. Thus, at least
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n(n − 1)/2 restrictions must be imposed on the contemporaneous matrix Γ0 to
recover the structural form parameters.
4.5.1 Impulse Response Functions
Following the identification, the structural innovations (µt) can be recovered from
the residuals εt. The impulse response functions (IRFs) and forecast error variance
decomposition (FEVDs) can also be estimated. The impulse response functions
are used to trace out the effect of structural innovations on observed variables.
That is, IRFs describe the evolution of the variable of interest along a specified
time horizon after a shock in a given moment. The SVAR can be rewritten in a
vector moving average form in terms of structural innovations as,




where φi are used to generate the effects of structural innovations on time
paths of data sequences. A plot function will depict the response of variables Yt+j




= φi l = 1, 2, ... (4.15)
4.5.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Forecast error variance decomposition is a way to quantify how important each
shock is in explaining the variation in each of the variables in the system. It is
equal to the fraction of the forecast error variance of each variable due to each
shock at each horizon. FEVD are usually carried out based on the moving average
representation shown in equation 4.14 with the h-step forecast error for the process
written as,




with Yt(h) being the optimal h-step forecast at period t for Xt+h. The corre-











i, j = 1, ..., n (4.17)




i=1 γij(h) = 1 for a given variable j.
4.6 SVAR Identification: Short-run restrictions
This section describes the set-up of an SVAR model for the economies of Eswa-
tini, Lesotho, Namibia and South-Africa. A six-variable SVAR model was esti-
mated independently for each CMA country following Kim and Roubini (2000)
and Aslanidi (2007). The estimated SVAR model for country i, in time period t
has the following endogenous variables,
Yit = [sarrt, lrsit, ldcit, lm1it, lcpiit, lgdpit]
′
The U.S. Federal Funds rate (ffrt) is included exogenously in models as a con-
trol for foreign monetary policy shocks in setting domestic monetary policy (Kim
and Roubini, 2000; Aslanidi, 2007). The repo-rate (sarrit) is used as a measure of
domestic monetary policy stance in the CMA. The real GDP (lgdpit) and inflation
(lcpiit) represent the economic activity in each country and help to characterize
the market in the economy. The short term interest rates are represented by the
lending rate spread (lrsit). This enables an investigation into the interaction of
monetary policy and the interest rate channel. Finally, domestic credit extension
(ldcit) and narrow money supply (lm1it) are important macroeconomic indicators
that capture the level of economic activity. These variables are included to identify
their dynamic effects on the real sector of the economy.
The focus of this paper is centred on the analysis of the resulting IRFs and
FEVDs which estimate the responses of given variables to innovations in another
variable in the system, ceteris paribus. As discussed earlier in the previous section,
the estimation of the SVAR requires an identification scheme where a set of the-
oretically valid restrictions are imposed on the elements of the contemporaneous
matrix Γ0. However, Famoroti and Tipoy (2019) and others argue that specifying
the model restrictions is a daunting task. This is because it is not clear which
aspects of the model arises due to the assumptions imposed on the model and
which arise from the data. Aslanidi (2007) argue that the method of imposing
restrictions is not different from other specification methods, although the results
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are likely to be sensitive to model specification and imposed restrictions. They
point that this approach makes the results more transparent because it can be
supported by economic theory.
The econometric identification of monetary policy shocks is crucial to the
model specification. Consequently, this study specifically follows the identifica-
tion scheme adopted by Kim and Roubini (2000) and Aslanidi (2007). However,
the model is modified to take into account the context of monetary policy conduct
in the CMA. The structural shocks are identified from their reduced form (εt) by










1 0 0 0 0 0
Γ21 1 0 0 0 0
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The structural disturbance in the model are represented by the µit matrix
where; µlgdp → domestic output shocks, µlcpi → domestic inflation shocks, µlm1 →
money supply shocks, µldc → domestic credit shocks, µlrs → lending rate spread
shocks, and µsarr → repo rate shocks. The residuals from reduced form equation
(εit) show the unexpected changes in each variable given the information available.
The non-zero coefficients indicate that a variable i affects contemporaneously
variable j. The restrictions imposed on the Γ0 matrix are based, firstly, on the
timing of information. A zero restriction is imposed based on the fact that some
variables are available to monetary authorities after a lag (e.g. GDP, inflation).
Secondly, behavioural restrictions are imposed on variables that respond slowly to
movements in financial and policy variables. The following restrictions are imposed
on the contemporaneous matrix based on theoretical economic expectations;
1. The first and second equations represent the goods market. Economic out-
put responds to price and financial signals (interest rate and credit) with a
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lag. This restriction reflects the assumption of nominal rigidities. Producers
do not instantaneously alter output and prices in response to innovations in
financial variables and monetary policy within a short time horizon. The
price equation is assumed to be contemporaneously affected by changes in
output (Aslanidi, 2007).
2. The money supply equation is assumed to be the reaction function of the
monetary authority, which sets the level of money after observing the cur-
rent values of output and the price levels (Kim and Roubini, 2000).
3. Domestic credit is assumed to contemporaneously respond to domestic out-
put, price levels, money supply and interest rates shocks. This is because
the real activity and domestic interest rates give households expectations of
future economic activity (Kim and Roubini, 2000). Similarly, the lending
rate spread is assumed to contemporaneously change with all variables ex-
cept GDP and money supply due to information lag. Borrowers will quickly
respond to the changes in the real cost of borrowing.
4. Finally, the repo is the main monetary policy instrument in the CMA; hence
we assume that it is the SARB’s monetary reaction function. Given the
inflation-targeting framework, the repo rate contemporaneously responds
only to changes in inflation, but not to any other variables. This means that
the reserve bank sets the repo rate only after observing the current level of
inflation (Ikhide and Uanguta, 2010; Seleteng, 2016).
In the case of a six-variable SVAR model, a just-identified model requires at
least 15 restrictions. This study imposed 18 restrictions on the contemporaneous
matrix. That is, the estimated model is over-identified. The over-identifying
restrictions can be validated/rejected by computing a likelihood ratio (LR) test
that compares the log-likelihood of the structural form and the log-likelihood of
the reduced form(Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004). Given the restrictions on Γ0, the
structural system of contemporaneous variables can be expressed as
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lgdpt =µlgdp
Γ21lgdpt + lcpit =µlcpi
Γ31lgdpt + Γ32lcpit + lm1t =µlm1
Γ41lgdpt + Γ42lcpit + Γ43lm1t + ldct =µldc
Γ52lcpit + Γ54ldct + lrst + Γ56sarrt =µlrs
Γ62lcpit + sarrt =µsarr
(4.19)
4.7 Diagnostic Tests
Diagnostic tests are used to check the stochastic properties of the model, such as
residual autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, normality and model stability. Since
the identification assumptions are not independently testable, a sensitivity analysis
will be performed to determine how the structural analysis based on the IRFs is
influenced by the selected lag structure. This sensitivity analysis is based on
estimating the SVAR for different lag structures. If the IRFs change considerably
for different lags of the variables, then we conclude that the assumed lag structure
heavily influences the structural inference (Zivot, 2000).
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5 Results And Empirical Analysis
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Appendix 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables in Eswatini, Lesotho,
Namibia, and South Africa. The results show that the lending rate spread and
the repo rate are highly volatile, as evidenced by the high standard deviations.
The skewness measures whether the distribution of the data is symmetrical or
asymmetrical. Money supply, inflation, domestic credit and economic output are
negatively skewed while the rest are positively skewed. This indicates that all vari-
ables are not normally distributed. The significance of the Jarque-Bera statistic
also confirms the non-normality of all variables.
Table 5.1: Summary statistics: Country-specific averages, 2000M2-
2018M12
Country LM1 LCPI LDC LRS LGDP SARR
Eswatini 3.30 1.97 3.16 6.68 3.39 -
Lesotho 3.43 1.96 3.08 8.96 3.13 -
Namibia 4.19 1.96 4.47 5.10 3.79 -
South Africa 5.85 1.98 6.23 3.86 5.29 8.03
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Central Bank of
Lesotho, Bank of Namibia, and Central Bank of Eswatini,
and the International Monetary Fund.
Table 5.1 compares the average values of the variables across the CMA. The
cross-country comparison reveals the economic and financial weight of the South
African economy within the CMA. South Africa has the highest economic output
at 95 percent of the entire region, while Lesotho accounts for only 0.65 percent.
Also, South Africa has the highest domestic credit extension and money supply,
followed by Namibia. As noted earlier, these differences are in part ascribed to
commercial banks in the LNS countries, transferring their excess liquid funds to
financial markets in South Africa. Lending spread rate is widest in Lesotho at 8.96
percent and narrowest in South Africa at 3.86 percent. However, there is evidence
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of convergence in price levels1 in the CMA. The average inflation rates lie closely
together between 91.2 and 95.5. This convergence in prices reveals the nature of
the CMA arrangement, which enables tariff-free trade and no costs for currency
conversion within the region.
5.1.1 Correlation Analysis
The results of the correlation analysis for each CMA member country is presented
in appendix C.2. The results show a wide range of relationships among the vari-
ables that merit further investigation. However, since the scope of this research
is to assess the impact of the monetary policy shocks, we limit our attention to
the repo rate. In line with economic theory, the repo rate has an inverse relation-
ship with money supply, inflation, domestic credit extension and economic output
across the CMA. The results also show a strong relationship between the vari-
ables, especially between inflation and economic growth. The correlation between
the repo rate and domestic output for the period under study is about -0.72 for
Namibia, Lesotho and Eswatini, while South Africa has -0.69. There is a consis-
tent positive correlation between the repo rate and the lending rate spread that
ranges from 0.35 (Eswatini) to 0.76 (Namibia).
5.2 Stationarity Tests
A starting point in the analysis of stationarity is to examine the data proper-
ties graphically and then confirm it statistically. Figure 5.1 shows a time series
plot of macroeconomic variables in the CMA. The first observation is that infla-
tion, money supply, domestic credit and economic output are all upward trending.
However, LEN countries experienced volatility in the financial sector following
the implementation of South Africa’s inflation targeting regime in 2000. The
volatility can be attributed to the SARB’s interest rate hikes that were aimed
towards achieving its inflation target as shown in panel A and G. The upward
trends provide a justification for their log transformation to pave the way for the
1Indexed such that CPI2010M6 = 100
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interpretation of the impulse responses as elasticities.
Secondly, since 2000, there have been two major shocks experienced in the
financial and real sectors in 2002 - 2003 and 2007 - 2008. During each shock,
the effects are more pronounced in the financial sector, with the subtle patterns
continuing for several periods after the shock. Compared to external global shocks,
there is an apparent lag between the repo rate and the U.S. federal funds rate.
This implies that when controlling for exogenous shocks, it is necessary to use
lagged terms to account for their delayed impact in the CMA.
Figure 5.1: Graphical stationarity test at levels, 2000M2-2018M12
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Central Bank of Lesotho, Bank of Namibia,
and Central Bank of Eswatini, and the International Monetary Fund.
Finally, the graphical inspection suggests that all variables exhibit non-stationary
patterns and thus require differencing to induce stationarity. The results of the
ADF and KPSS unit root tests are presented in appendix C.3. Both results con-
firm that all variables are non-stationary at levels. This means that the time-series
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properties (mean, variance) are not constant. Therefore, it is necessary to differ-
ence and then test for stationarity. The test results of the variables at their first
differences show that the time series properties are constant. It can be concluded
that variables are integrated of order one I(1), and thus they may be included in
the model at first differences.
5.3 Cointegration Tests
The results from the Johansen cointegration test are presented in appendix C.4.
The test results indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating equation is
rejected for all countries at the 5 percent significance level. These results raise
an important issue about the appropriate model for estimation. One option is to
estimate a structural error correction model (SVECM) at first differences. How-
ever, this will result in losing part of the information contained in the series due
to differencing (Aslanidi, 2007). An alternative approach is to estimate the model
at levels. The alternative approach seems plausible, given that the cointegration
tests suggest that the residuals are stationary. In fact, Herrera and Pesavento
(2013) argue that even if the variables are cointegrated, the most robust form of
model specification is to estimate the reduced form VAR at levels. Following the
recommendations from Herrera and Pesavento (2013) and Aslanidi (2007), this
study estimates the reduced form VAR at levels.
5.4 Optimal Lag Selection Criteria
According to the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwartz information cri-
terion (SC), the model reporting the lowest AIC or SC values is preferred. The
results of lag length selection criteria are presented in appendix C.4. The results
are mixed. For Eswatini, Namibia and South Africa, the AIC proposes the use of
four lags and two lags for Lesotho. In contrast, the SC recommends the selection
of one lag for all countries. Given these inconsistencies, the empirical approach
is to select the lag length with the lowest value between the two (Lütkepohl and
Krätzig, 2004; Shrestha and Bhatta, 2017). Therefore, we proceed with the op-
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timal lag identified by the Schwartz information criterion since it has the lowest
value. The maximum lag order of one will be used as it is sufficient enough to
render serially uncorrelated VAR errors.
5.5 Structural VAR Results
The empirical question we attempt to answer here is: how do real and financial
macroeconomic variables in the CMA respond to a sudden change in the mon-
etary policy instrument. For purposes of our analysis, the South African repo
rate has been identified as a monetary policy instrument used in the CMA. The
effects of monetary policy shocks are examined through the estimated IRFs and
FEVDs. The impulse response functions are computed, as shown in equation 4.12.
However, the contemporaneous matrix coefficients( Γ0) must first be estimated in
order to determine the vector moving average coefficients (φi). The structural
VAR is over-identified, and so the usual LR test for over-identification is applied,
under the null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid (Kim and Roubini, 2000;
Aslanidi, 2007). Table 5.2 shows the identifying restrictions are not rejected at a
5 percent significance level for all countries.
Table 5.2: Likelihood test of over-identifying restriction
Country Chi-square Significance level
Eswatini X 2(2) = 0.6242 0.732
Lesotho X 2(2) = 0.4684 0.791
Namibia X 2(2) = 0.3609 0.835
South Africa X 2(2) = 1.1840 0.553
Source: Author’s own contribution
5.5.1 Impulse Response Functions
The impulse responses of economic output, inflation, narrow money supply, do-
mestic credit, and lending rate spread are generated from the SVAR and calculated
for an eight-month horizon. Figures 5.2 to 5.6 display the impulse responses of the
selected variables to a one per cent positive shock in the repo rate (monetary tight-
ening). For comparison, each figure presents the impulse response functions of a
given variable for each CMA member country. Impulse Response graphs contain
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the 90 percent confidence bands about the impulse response function. A response
is statistically significant if its computed error bands do not include zero.
Figure 5.2 shows that a positive shock in the repo rate has a statistically signifi-
cant contractionary effect on economic output in the CMA. In Eswatini, economic
output only begins to respond to repo rate shock after the second month and
declines briefly by 0.05 percent, before trending upwards after the fifth month.
In Namibia, economic output decreases by about 0.04 percent before increasing;
however, the significance decreases after the second month. In Lesotho, economic
output continues to decline by around 0.06 percent beyond the eight-month hori-
zon. The response in South Africa stabilises after four months after declining by
0.15 percent. These findings are in contrast to (Seleteng, 2016) who found that
the response of economic growth in the CMA region to a positive shock in the
repo rate is positive and statistically significant for one year only. However, the
pattern and speed of adjustment of our results correspond with results from other
studies (Buigut (2009) in EAC; Sheefeni and Ocran (2012) in Namibia).
(a) Eswatini (b) Lesotho
(c) Namibia (d) South Africa
Figure 5.2: Economic output responses to a repo rate shock
Source: Author’s own contribution
The impulse response functions of price levels reveal a significant and contem-
poraneous effect of repo rate shocks in all countries, as shown in figure 5.3. These
results are particularly crucial, given that inflation is a primary target in South-
Africa’s monetary policy conduct. Following a one-time increase in the repo rate
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by one per cent, price levels in South Africa rapidly increase by over 0.1 percent
within five months but stabilise after that. In the LEN countries, price levels
continue to sluggishly increase by around 0.03 percent beyond the eight-month
horizon, with Namibia having the slowest response. These results contradict theo-
retical expectation from a contractionary monetary policy. These unconventional
observations have been extensively investigated in the literature and have been
dubbed the price puzzle2 (Kim and Roubini, 2000; Leeper, Sims, and Zha, 1996).
Ncube and Ndou (2013) have suggested that this puzzle is commonly found when
using recursive identification strategies and thus, additional variables that capture
future anticipated inflation should be included in the model. However, the U.S.
federal reserve funds rate was incorporated in our estimated models to control for
exogenous shocks. The results did not significantly change when world oil prices
were included. These could be interpreted as a signal that the federal funds rate
is not sufficient to explain changes to South Africa’s monetary policy. Findings
similar to ours have been reported in other studies of the CMA and other devel-
oping countries (Buigut, 2009; Ikhide and Uanguta, 2010; Gumata, Kabundi, and
Ndou (2013); Seleteng, 2016; Mkhonta, 2018).
(a) Eswatini (b) Lesotho
(c) Namibia (d) South Africa
Figure 5.3: Inflation responses to a repo rate shock
Source: Author’s own contribution
2The price puzzle is described as an effect of the central bank having superior information
regarding future economic conditions which leads it to raise interest rates because it expects
inflation to rise in the future (Ncube and Ndou, 2013).
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The response of narrow money supply due to a positive shock to the repo rate
shows conflicting policy outcomes, as shown in figure 5.4. The results are insignif-
icant for Namibia and South Africa. In Eswatini, there is an immediate decline
in the money supply by about 0.2 percent that becomes stable after the third
month. In contrast, the response in Lesotho is positive and continues persistently
upwards by over 0.4 percent. These results suggest that the overall impact of an
increase in the repo rate on narrow money supply in the CMA is inconclusive.
Economic theory suggests that a positive interest rate shock causes money supply
to decrease due to the increased cost of borrowing. Evidence from previous studies
in the CMA also reveals that the the effect of interest rate on money supply is
inconclusive. Seleteng (2016) and Dlamini and Skosana (2017) found that money
supply in the CMA seems to be unresponsive to shocks to the repo rate, while
Ikhide and Uanguta (2010) and Gumata, Kabundi, and Ndou (2013) found a neg-
ative relationship. Section 5.2.2 will explore the sources of the asymmetric money
supply responses in the CMA.
(a) Eswatini (b) Lesotho
(c) Namibia (d) South Africa
Figure 5.4: Money supply responses to a repo rate shock
Source: Author’s own contribution
Similar to the money supply, the results for domestic credit are not equally
optimistic. The responses of domestic credit to a positive change in the repo rate
shown in figure 5.5. Domestic credit in South Africa is not responsive changes
to the repo rate. In Eswatini, there is a statistically significant contemporaneous
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response of credit to the private sector. It declines sharply by 4 percent but
rebounds upwards after the third month. In Lesotho and Namibia, the opposite
results are found. Domestic credit responds positively (by 4 percent in Lesotho
and 0.8 percent in Namibia) to a change in the repo rate but rebounds downward
after the second month. The overall impact of a positive repo rate shock in the
CMA, on domestic credit, is inconclusive. Ikhide and Uanguta (2010) and Seleteng
(2016) found results similar to ours. In contrast, Gumata, Kabundi, and Ndou
(2013) and Dlamini and Skosana (2017) found that a positive shock to the repo
rate is immediately followed by a decline in domestic credit.
The results presented in figure 5.4 - 5.5 could be reflective of some of the key
challenges facing policymakers in the LEN countries. The banking sector in the
LEN countries is characterised by high commercial bank excess reserves. This
excess liquidity renders monetary policy ineffective since banks can simply draw
on these funds to continue extending credit to borrowers. In a Lesotho case study,
Thamae (2014) concluded that excess liquidity in the financial sector is driven
by undeveloped financial sector and dominance of the government in economic
activities. These results may also reflect the fact that financial developments in
Lesotho are lagging behind Eswatini, South Africa, and Namibia.
(a) Eswatini (b) Lesotho
(c) Namibia (d) South Africa
Figure 5.5: Domestic credit responses to a repo rate shock
Source: Author’s own contribution
Finally, figure 5.6 shows the response of lending rate spread to one per cent
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rise in the repo rate. Except Lesotho, lending rate spread responses are found to
be significant in the CMA. In Eswatini, lending rate spread continues to increase
by over 0.04 percent following innovations to the repo rate. In Namibia, there
is a sharp increase by about 0.04 percent but declines after the second month.
There is an instantaneous decline in the lending rate spread in South Africa by
approximately 0.07 percent, followed by an increase in the second month. It can be
concluded that lending rate spread responds positively to monetary policy shocks
in the case of the LEN countries. In line with our findings, Ikhide and Uanguta
(2010), and Seleteng (2016) found that the response of lending rates to a positive
shock on the repo rate is positive and statistically significant. In the case of
Lesotho, a possible explanation is that since the lending rates are the highest in
the region, an increase in the repo rate will no significantly affect the commercial
banks’ balance sheets, hence they do not instantly change their lending rates.
In South Africa, the results found in Gumata, Kabundi, and Ndou (2013) and
Bonga-Bonga (2010) were similar to ours.
(a) Eswatini (b) Lesotho
(c) Namibia (d) South Africa
Figure 5.6: Lending rate spread responses to a repo rate shock
Source: Author’s own contribution
The results presented in figure 5.2 - 5.6 show diverse responses to the repo
rate shocks in the CMA. Economic output responses show that output in Lesotho
continues to decline beyond the eight-month time horizon but remains unchanged
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in the rest of the CMA. The response of inflation shows that after six months,
inflation in South Africa remains unchanged while it continues to grow in the
LEN countries. The responses of money supply, domestic credit and lending rates
are asymmetric in the CMA. This implies, all things being equal, South Africa’s
monetary policy interventions may have different consequences on these variables
in the LEN countries. During periods of economic instability, these asymmetric
responses may exacerbate conditions in the LEN countries, exposing them to the
risk of further economic downturn. To illustrate this point, let us assume, for
example, that South Africa is faced with inflation above the official target range
of 6 percent. The SARB will respond by implementing a contractionary monetary
policy which increases the repo rate. Our estimated results suggest that this policy
action will initially cause a slight increase in inflation, while economic output will
slightly decline across all countries in the CMA. In Lesotho and Namibia, our
results suggest that money supply and domestic credit will increase in response to
this policy change. If additional policy interventions are not implemented in these
countries, the increase in money supply and domestic credit will cause inflation
to continue rising. Therefore, it is crucial for the LEN countries to develop policy
strategies that may help to offset the negative impact of South Africa’s monetary
policy shocks on their economies.
The results presented in figure 5.4 - 5.6 have revealed some of the problems
associated with the CMA regime. Since the ZAR also circulates through the LEN
countries, authorities in the LEN do not have full ability to immediately alter the
amount of domestic ZAR floating alongside their currencies (Dlamini and Skosana,
2017). The exclusion of the volume of ZAR circulating at any given time in the
LENS complicates our understanding of the dynamics of monetary policy in the
CMA. Given the high volume of the South African currency circulating in the LEN
countries (estimated around 76 percent in 2006-07), the effects of South Africa’s
policy interventions in the CMA may not be fully captured if the volume of the
ZAR is not accounted for. In the next section, we explore some of the factors that
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might have influenced the observed responses to monetary policy shocks.
5.5.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Since the identification of SVAR models is based on theoretical economic expec-
tations, their results alone are considered inadequate. According to Maturu and
Ndirangu (2010), the variance decomposition results show the relative importance
of a given endogenous variable in explaining the out-of-sample forecast error in
another endogenous variable of interest under the analysis. For instance, FEVDs
will enable us to characterise the relative importance of the repo rate in explaining
the out-of-sample forecast errors in GDP. If a larger proportion of out-of-sample
forecast errors in GDP are explained by the repo rate, then there is a greater pos-
sibility that the monetary policy instrument is a useful tool. In addition, it is most
likely that the corresponding impulse responses will as well be statistically signifi-
cant and large in magnitude. This implies that variance decomposition results are
useful in validating the impulse response function results.
Appendix C.5 presents the forecast error variance decomposition results for all
variables in each CMA countries. The shocks have been decomposed into a 24-
month time horizon. It is evident the variance decomposition results confirm our
findings from the impulse response analysis. The results shown in Appendix C.5
can be summarised as follows: Firstly, apart from own shocks, the second most
important variable in explaining the forecast errors in economic output during
the short time horizon is the repo rate. The repo rate’s importance in explain-
ing fluctuations in real economic output increases steadily with time but differs
across countries. Secondly, the repo rate is the third most important variable that
explains the variance errors in inflation, after itself and economic output. The im-
portance of the repo rate generally remains steady with time, with an exception
in Namibia. Lastly, inflation is more important in explaining the fluctuations in
the repo rate for South Africa than in the LEN countries. These findings reveal
the fact South African authorities do not consider prevalent economic situations
in the LEN countries when implementing monetary policy in the CMA.
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The forecast error variance decomposition results may also be useful to explain
the sources of asymmetric responses observed in money supply, lending rate spread
and domestic credit. The variance decomposition of money supply shows that
after a period of 12 months, shocks to the repo rate explain over 20 percent of
fluctuations in Lesotho. In Eswatini, Namibia and South Africa, this is less than
10 percent. This suggests that money supply in Lesotho is more sensitive to
changes in the repo rate compared to the other LEN countries. Shocks to money
supply explain over 10 percent of fluctuations in the lending rate spread in South
Africa. This is greater compared to other countries and may explain the observed
initial decline in South Africa. The presence of a large informal sector may also
be attributed to the observed asymmetrical monetary policy responses. Davoodi,
Dixit, and Pinter (2013) argued developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa are
characterised by an underdeveloped formal financial market that put constraints
on the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
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6 Robustness Analysis
To ensure robustness of our results, further econometric checks have to be per-
formed on the estimated models. One of the standard tests for robustness in SVAR
models is the sensitivity test. This test is performed by re-estimating the model
under a different lag structure. The same method of identification which was dis-
cussed previously is used, and the number of lags is also chosen according to the
lag length criterion tests. The lag selection under this test is based on the AIC re-
sults in appendix C.4. That is, we used four lags for Eswatini, Namibia and South
Africa’s economies while only two lags were used Lesotho’s model. The test results
presented in Appendix C.6 are in line with our findings, with significant differences
in money supply and domestic credit. Contrary to prior our findings where money
supply responses were significant for Eswatini and Lesotho, the re-estimated model
suggests that money supply in the CMA is insignificantly responsive to innovations
to the repo rate at the 90 percent confidence level. The observed inconsistencies
may be caused by several factors such as structural breaks, wrong selection of
variables etc. However, the fact that all other variables have consistent responses
to monetary policy shocks in both models suggests that further robustness tests
may be necessary.
Another test for the robustness of the econometric results is the break-point
test, where the model over the whole sample period is compared with the model
estimated over various sub-samples. In this case, the data series is divided into
two parts; the first sub-sample is from the period 2000M2 to 2009M6, the second
sub-sample is from the period 2009M7 to 2018M12. Under the same conditions of
identification, Appendix C.7 shows the results of the test for each country. The
results show that the estimated impulse response patterns of the sub-sample are
consistent with the whole sample. This suggests that the estimated results are
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robust to sample size.
Table 6.1: Joint residual heteroskedasticity and normality tests
Country Normality Heteroskedasticity
Jarque-Bera Prob. Chi-square Prob.
Eswatini 22.3542 0.2835 17.2822 0.3676
Lesotho 16.7221 0.5773 14.5703 0.5563
Namibia 12.3066 0.6849 16.9862 0.3835
South Africa 18.6076 0.4899 22.2764 0.1346
Source: Author’s own contribution
In addition, the VAR residuals were tested for heteroskedasticity and normal-
ity. The results presented in figure 6.1 indicate that the null hypothesis that the
residuals are multivariate normal cannot be rejected for all countries. There is
no heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Lastly, figure 6.2 shows that the null hy-
pothesis of no correlation at lag order one cannot be rejected at the 5 percent
significance level.
Table 6.2: Lagrange-Multiplier test for serial autocorrelation
Chi-square Lags Significance level
Eswatini X 2(49) = 57.6425 1 0.1860
Lesotho X 2(49) = 64.2429 1 0.1467
Namibia X 2(49) = 56.0724 1 0.2268
South Africa X 2(49) = 55.0792 1 0.2556
Source: Author’s own contribution
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of monetary policy shocks on
the Common Monetary Area. The LEN currencies are fixed to the South African
rand, and capital flows between countries are tariff-free. However, the CMA can-
not be characterised as a fully-fledged monetary union since monetary policy is set
independently in South Africa. Interest rates in the LEN countries cannot deviate
too far from those in South Africa. As a result, the South African repo rate is
the relevant monetary policy instrument in the region. The effect of unexpected
monetary policy shocks has remained largely unresolved, especially in developing
countries. There is a limited number of studies on the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism in developing countries compared to industrialised countries.
The current literature on monetary policy transmission mechanism in the CMA
differs in their results depending on various aspects like model specification, the
econometric technique used, variable selection and the period under study.
This study comparatively evaluates the effect of shocks to the South African
repo rate on the LEN economies. Our analysis is based on a six-variable structural
VAR model estimated using monthly data for the period 2000 to 2018. Due to
data limitations, the study applied a Chow-Lin temporal disaggregation method
to interpolate monthly economic output. Unlike previous studies in the CMA, the
U.S. federal funds rate was used to control for changes due to external factors. In
addition, the study focused primarily on the period following the implementation
of the inflation targeting regime to better reflect short-run dynamics of monetary
policy.
Our findings suggest that an exogenous and temporary increase in the South
African repo rate tends to be followed by a statistically significant decline in out-
put and a rise in price levels for all countries in the CMA. The magnitude of the
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impact varies by country, with South Africa experiencing a significant decrease in
output and an increase in price levels. These results seem to be stable over differ-
ent sample periods. The findings also showed that the effect of monetary policy
shocks on domestic credit, lending rate spread and money supply is asymmet-
ric across the CMA. These findings suggest that monetary policy interventions
employed in South Africa may have a negative effect on the financial sector in
the LEN countries. If further policy strategies are not implemented in the LEN
countries to offset these effects, economic conditions in the LEN countries may
continue to worsen. The empirical literature suggests several factors that might
have contributed to the observed asymmetric responses in the CMA. One of the
causes might be the underdevelopment of the financial markets and, hence, the
weak transmission of financial signals to commercial banks, investors and con-
sumers. The presence of informal markets in the CMA is also a source of concern
in the transmission of monetary policy. Given the large size of informal economies,
national account statistics may not fully reflect the dynamics of monetary policy.
The paucity of data on the total volume of the South African currency circulating
in the LEN countries may have also affected our results, particularly the response
of narrow money supply.
7.1 Policy Recommendations
Our results suggest that it is important for the South African authorities to pay
close attention to the economic conditions in the LEN countries when implement-
ing monetary policy in order to avoid exacerbating economic instability in the
LEN countries. The LEN countries are also recommended to improve measures
to estimate the volume of the ZAR circulation their respective economies through
regular monetary surveys. This will provide a more accurate estimation of the
dynamics of monetary policy in the LEN countries. Improving the efficacy of
monetary policy in the CMA may require addressing these issues and, among oth-
ers, ensuring that monetary targets and interest rate policy are consistent among
all members.
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7.2 Limitations and Further Research
This study suffers from several limitations that may be addressed by future re-
search. Firstly, our model does not include any measures of fiscal policy and
exchange rate, which may have an effect on the monetary policy shocks in the
CMA. Secondly, our research focused only on monetary policy shocks. It could
also be interesting to explore the effects of output shocks, demand shocks and
supply shocks in the CMA. Thirdly, Gumata, Kabundi, and Ndou (2013) have ar-
gued that the transmission of monetary policy shocks in South Africa has changed
since the 2008 global financial crisis. Although our results showed robustness to
the break-point test, future research could estimate the transmission of South
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A.1 Definition of Variables
Abbreviations of variables
SARR: South Africa’s Repo Rate
LM1: Log of Narrow Money Supply
LCPI: Log of Consumer Price Index
LDC: Log of Domestic Credit
LRS: Lending Rate Spread
LGDP: Log of Gross Domestic Product
Repo Rate: It is a short-term rate at which a central bank discounts or re-discounts
the various classes of bills, promissory notes and other securities to meet liquidity
needs of commercial banks.
Money Supply (M1): The is the sum of physical currency in the hands of
the public and checkable deposits held in commercial banks. It is regarded the
narrowest definition of money in the sense that it reflects the most liquid form of
financial assets.
CPI/Inflation: It is an index that measures how prices of consumer goods have
changed over a given period of time. It is calculated by comparing the prices of a
fixed basket of goods and services between two intervals.
Domestic Credit : This reflects the total financial resources provided to the
private sector by financial institutions (banks, pension funds, money lenders i.e.)
Lending Rate Spread : This is the difference between lending rate and deposit
rate. Lending rate is defined as the rate at which commercial banks lend money
to individuals and businesses to meet their short-term financial needs. This rate
is typically depends on creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing.
Deposit rate is defined as the interest rate paid out by commercial banks to account
holders on cash deposits held at the bank. The rate depends on multiple factors
such as the amount of cash deposited and the type of account.
Economic Output : This represents the total market value of final goods and
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services produced in a country in a given time period. This accounts only for both
market and non-market activities that can be statistically measured/estimated.
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Appendix B
B.1 History of the Common Monetary Area
Wang et al. (2007) have provided the following summary of events in the CMA:
Table 1: A timeline of major events in the CMA history
- Before 1960 An informal monetary union with South African pound as a
common currency
- 1960s South African pound was replaced by the South African
Rand (ZAR). Eswatini and Lesotho become independent from
Britain.
- 1974 Eswatini, Lesotho, and South Africa signed the Rand Mon-
etary Area Agreement. The agreement allowed Eswatini to
issue its national currency, Eswatini Lilangeni (SZL), pegged
at par to the ZAR.
- 1980 Lesotho established its central bank and started to issue its
national currency, Lesotho Loti (LSL), pegged at par to the
ZAR
- 1986 RMA was replaced by CMA. Additional provisions regard-
ing capital control, seigniorage compensation and intra-CMA
funds transfers were made. Eswatini prohibited the use of
ZAR within its boarders.
- 1989 Exchange restrictions that were due to limitations on conver-
sion of balances upon termination of one member were lifted
from the CMA agreement.
- 1990s South Africa and Namibia both became independent.
Namibia formally joined the CMA in 1990 and subsequently
issued its own curreny, pegged at par to the ZAR.
- 2000 The South African Reserve Bank adopted an inflation target-
ing framework.
- 2003 Eswatini re-authorised the circulation of the ZAR alongside
the SZL.
B.2 Institutional Arrangement of the CMA
Collings (1978) and Tjirongo (1995) have highlighted the following aspects of the
CMA arrangement:
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1. Currency Arrangement : Under the CMA agreement Lesotho, Eswatini, and
Namibia (LEN) have the right to issue their national currencies only within
their jurisdiction. The bilateral agreements between South Africa and the
three member countries specifies areas, in addition to South Africa, where
the ZAR is a legal tender. Currently, the ZAR is a legal tender throughout
the CMA. The bilateral agreements also require the LEN countries to per-
mit authorised dealers within their boarders to convert their currencies at
par with the ZAR without any restrictions. There is a clearing system that
repatriates ZAR coins and banknotes circulating in the other member coun-
tries. The central banks of Lesotho and Namibia are required back their
currency issues by a mixture of South African Rand assets‡. Such assets
may include: 1) the central bank’s holdings of rand balances, 2) the ZAR
currency the central bank holds in a Special Rand Deposit Account with
the SARB, 3) South African government stocks, 4) Investments in South
Africa’s Corporation for Public Deposit.
2. Flow of Funds Inside the CMA: There are no legal restrictions imposed
on transfer of funds (current and capital) to or from a member country.
The only exception is that member countries have control over investment
and liquidity requirements for financial institutions within their boarders.
These regulations require financial institutions to invest funds in domestic
securities or extend credit to local businesses and individuals. The purpose
of these regulations is to address the concern that funds generated in the
LEN and deposited with local financial institutions tended to flow to the
more developed capital markets in South Africa.
3. Access to South African Financial Markets : The agreement provides the
LEN countries with access to South African financial markets, but only
through authorised investments channels or securities that can be held in
financial institutions in South Africa. However, there are currently no ar-
rangements for South Africa to participate in short-term money markets
(treasury bills, t-bonds e.t.c) issued by the LEN countries. Under special
‡Eswatini was not included in this agreement in part due to events in 1986, see appendix 7.
for more details.
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circumstances, the LEN countries can enter into bilateral negotiations with
South Africa to obtain temporary bank credit. The SARB therefore acts as
a lender of last in order to maintain financial stability within the CMA.
4. Management of Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions : Under article 5
of the CMA, respective central banks have responsibility over management
of gold and foreign exchange reserves. In order to enable the SARB to keep
track of the exchange control system, the LEN countries are required to sur-
render their gold and foreign exchange receipts of residents to South African
authorities. The exchange control regulations of the LEN are required to be
similar to those in practice in South Africa which are amended from time to
time.
5. Compensatory Payments : Due to forgone seigniorage by the LEN countries,
article 6 provides a formula for determining compensation payments that
represent a return on the ZAR circulating within their national borders.






) · (cuR), where (ibondyield)
is the annual yield on the most recently issued long-term South-African
government stock, cuR is the estimated volume of ZAR circulating within
a member country. The 2/3 ratio was established on the assumption that
it approximates the yield of a portfolio of reserve assets comprising both
long-term and short-term maturities.
6. Consultations and other Provisions : All member are obliged to jointly work
together to avoid disruptive capital flows arising as a result of policy imple-
mentation in the CMA. The member countries have established a commission
to facilitate with policy implementation and consultation. The commission
holds regular consultations with the aim of attuning the interest of member
countries on common issues pertaining to monetary and foreign exchange




C.1 CMA Descriptive Statistics, 2000M2-2018M12
Panel I: Eswatini
Statistic LM1 LCPI LDC LRS∗ LGDP
Mean 3.30 1.97 3.16 6.68 3.39
St. Dev. 0.30 0.16 0.26 0.62 0.23
Max 3.78 2.22 3.53 11.50 3.72
Min 2.78 1.64 1.53 5.40 2.95
Skewness -0.15 -0.08 -3.12 2.10 -0.10
Jarque-Bera 18.25 14.25 2469.16 2144.78 14.49
Probability 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001
Panel II: Lesotho
Statistic LM1 LCPI LDC LRS∗ LGDP
Mean 3.43 1.96 3.08 8.96 3.13
St. Dev. 0.23 0.14 0.67 1.77 0.25
Max 3.73 2.18 3.74 13.17 3.48
Min 2.23 1.71 0.64 6.83 2.70
Skewness -0.41 -0.14 -1.10 0.71 -0.08
Jarque-Bera 19.32 15.60 47.34 119.20 17.22
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel III: Namibia
Statistic LM1 LCPI LDC LRS∗ LGDP
Mean 4.19 1.96 4.47 5.10 3.79
St. Dev. 0.45 0.15 0.22 1.12 0.27
Max 4.66 2.19 4.76 9.08 4.19
Min 1.56 1.64 3.98 3.23 3.33
Skewness -2.02 -0.23 -0.61 1.53 -0.07
Jarque-Bera 526.30 11.01 20.28 119.20 15.47
Probability 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗ LRS and SARR are expressed in percentages while LM1, LCPI, LDC and LGDP are log
transformations.
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Panel IV: South Africa
Statistic LM1 LCPI LDC LRS∗ LGDP SARR∗
Mean 5.85 1.98 6.23 3.86 5.29 8.03
St. Dev. 0.25 0.12 0.23 0.79 0.22 2.52
Max 6.21 2.19 6.54 6.24 5.60 13.50
Min 5.40 1.76 5.78 2.30 4.49 5.00
Skewness -0.29 0.09 -0.46 0.84 -0.29 0.71
Jarque-Bera 16.69 15.37 21.29 27.55 16.61 25.61
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
C.2 Correlation Matrices
Panel I: Eswatini
LM1 LCPI LDC LRS LGDP SARR
LM1 1.00
LCPI 0.99 1.00
LDC -0.03 -0.05 1.00
LRS -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 1.00
LGDP 0.99 0.99 -0.02 -0.07 1.00
SARR -0.76 -0.72 -0.29 0.35 -0.73 1.00
Panel II: Lesotho
LM1 LCPI LDC LRS LGDP SARR
LM1 1.00
LCPI 0.93 1.00
LDC 0.88 0.88 1.00
LRS -0.40 -0.37 -0.40 1.00
LGDP 0.92 1.00 0.87 -0.35 1.00
SARR -0.61 -0.72 -0.58 0.68 -0.72 1.00
Panel III: Namibia
LM1 LCPI LDC LRS LGDP SARR
LM1 1.00
LCPI 0.83 1.00
LDC 0.86 0.98 1.00
LRS -0.70 -0.78 -0.82 1.00
LGDP 0.83 0.99 0.97 -0.75 1.00
SARR -0.61 -0.73 -0.77 0.76 -0.73 1.00
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Panel IV: South Africa
LM1 LCPI LDC LRS LGDP SARR
LM1 1.00
LCPI 0.98 1.00
LDC 0.99 0.97 1.00
LRS -0.87 -0.83 -0.90 1.00
LGDP 1.00 0.98 0.99 -0.87 1.00
SARR -0.72 -0.69 -0.72 0.70 -0.74 1.00
C.3 Unit Root Tests
Panel I: ADF test results by country, 2000M2-2018M12
Country Levels First Differences Decision
Constant Trend Constant Trend
LM1
ESW -0.94 -2.18 -11.50∗∗∗ -11.51∗∗∗ I(1)
LES -1.72 -2.31 -9.44∗∗∗ -9.48∗∗∗ I(1)
NAM -1.84 -3.97∗∗∗ -11.55∗∗∗ -11.53∗∗∗ I(1)
RSA -1.66 -0.0.79 -9.31∗∗∗ -9.47∗∗∗ I(1)
LCPI
ESW -0.20 -3.22∗ -10.42∗∗∗ -10.34∗∗∗ I(1)
LES -1.96 -1.33 -6.94∗∗∗ -7.21∗∗∗ I(1)
NAM -3.37∗∗ -4.37∗∗∗ -5.55∗∗∗ -5.99∗∗∗ I(1)
RSA -0.32 -1.92 -5.91∗∗∗ -5.89∗∗∗ I(1)
LDC
ESW -2.94∗∗ -2.95 -15.38∗∗∗ -15.35∗∗∗ I(1)
LES -1.95 -3.36∗ -11.38∗∗∗ -11.38∗∗∗ I(1)
NAM -4.93∗∗∗ -1.43 -7.47∗∗∗ -8.28∗∗∗ I(1)
RSA -2.78∗ -0.74 -6.96∗∗∗ -7.36∗∗∗ I(1)
LRS
ESW -1.26 -1.04 -4.59∗∗∗ -4.72∗∗∗ I(1)
LES -1.85 -1.75 -8.06∗∗∗ -8.04∗∗∗ I(1)
NAM -2.39 -2.41 -12.02∗∗∗ -12.12∗∗∗ I(1)
RSA -2.44 -3.45∗∗ -10.41∗∗∗ -10.45∗∗∗ I(1)
LGDP
ESW -1.64 -3.44∗∗ -11.91∗∗∗ 12.05∗∗∗ I(1)
LES -2.37 1.84 -7.19∗∗∗ -7.69∗∗∗ I(1)
NAM -1.21 -2.75 -13.51∗∗∗ -13.57∗∗∗ I(1)
RSA -3.61∗∗∗ -1.27 -8.68∗∗∗ -9.47∗∗∗ I(1)
SARR RSA -1.99 -2.31 -4.39∗∗∗ 4.40∗∗∗ I(1)
Note: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is performed with the null
hypothesis that the series has a unit root. The results present the value of the
test-statistic, where (∗)→ p < 0.1, (∗∗)→ p < 0.05, and (∗∗∗)→ p < 0.01.
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Panel II: KPSS test results by country, 2000M2-2018M12
Country Levels First Differences Decision
Constant Trend Constant Trend
LM1
ESW 4.6385 0.5356 0.0683∗ 0.0586∗ I(1)
LES 3.9946 0.5260 0.1322∗ 0.0510∗ I(1)
NAM 3.4720 0.2511 0.0424∗ 0.0478∗ I(1)
RSA 4.5826 0.7700 0.2680∗ 0.0667∗ I(1)
LCPI
ESW 4.6619 0.2666 0.1587∗ 0.0417∗ I(1)
LES 4.6517 0.6915 0.4576∗ 0.0534∗ I(1)
NAM 4.5893 0.4007 1.0431 0.1412∗ I(1)
RSA 4.6400 0.4278 0.0873∗ 0.0591∗ I(1)
LDC
ESW 0.2225∗ 0.2089 0.0285∗ 0.0254∗ I(1)
LES 3.9930 0.5673 0.0221∗ 0.06578∗ I(1)
NAM 4.4341 1.0585 1.0977 0.0887∗ I(1)
RSA 4.5194 1.0314 0.6532 0.0822∗ I(1)
LRS
ESW 0.8715 0.8574 0.3334∗ 0.0819∗ I(1)
LES 1.2771 0.8452 0.1151∗ 0.0796∗ I(1)
NAM 2.7994 0.5297 0.0713∗ 0.0385∗ I(1)
RSA 3.7683 0.5409 0.0623∗ 0.0315∗ I(1)
LGDP
ESW 4.6568 0.2931 0.1459∗ 0.0329∗ I(1)
LES 4.6670 0.4071 0.5871∗ 0.1682∗ I(1)
NAM 4.6586 0.3016 0.0758∗ 0.0783∗ I(1)
RSA 4.6133 1.0492 0.838 0.1072∗ I(1)
SARR RSA 2.6999 0.2865 0.0928∗ 0.0411∗ I(1)
Note: The Kwiatkowski–Phillips– Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test is performed
with the null hypothesis that the series is stationary. KPSS use a Newey–West
automatic bandwidth, using a Bartlett kernel. The results present the value
of the test-statistic, where (∗)→ p > 0.05.
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C.4 Johansen Cointegration Test
Panel I: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)








None∗ 0.1619 171.5018 95.7537 0.0000
At most 1∗ 0.1156 109.0992 69.8189 0.0040
At most 2 0.0883 42.7146 47.8561 0.1397
At most 3 0.0700 22.1117 29.7991 0.2923
At most 4 0.0179 5.9241 15.4947 0.7045
At most 5 0.0084 1.8850 3.8415 0.1698
Lesotho
None∗ 0.2258 132.1317 95.7536 0.0000
At most 1∗ 0.1275 75.0588 69.8189 0.0018
At most 2 0.0768 44.6472 47.8561 0.0970
At most 3 0.0660 26.8258 29.7971 0.1060
At most 4 0.0344 11.6054 15.4947 0.1769
At most 5 0.0168 3.7923 3.8415 0.0515
Namibia
None∗ 0.2792 196.7564 95.7536 0.0000
At most 1∗ 0.1957 123.7396 69.8189 0.0000
At most 2∗ 0.1256 75.1742 47.8561 0.0000
At most 3∗ 0.0983 45.2479 29.7971 0.0004
At most 4∗ 0.0781 2.2888 15.4947 0.1769
At most 5∗ 0.0185 4.1626 3.8415 0.0515
South Africa
None∗ 0.1896 150.7818 95.7537 0.0000
At most 1∗ 0.1747 103.9009 69.8189 0.0000
At most 2∗ 0.1297 61.0785 47.8561 0.0018
At most 3∗ 0.0681 30.0960 29.7991 0.0462
At most 4 0.0560 14.3711 15.4947 0.0733
At most 5 0.0068 1.15283 3.8415 0.2164
Note: Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level. (∗) denotes
rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% significance level.
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C.5 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
(a) Eswatini
Lag LogL AIC SC
0 1748.048 -15.606 -15.484
1 1970.139 -17.024 -15.924∗
2 2087.568 -17.503 -15.425
3 2152.990 -17.516 -14.460
4 2263.043 -17.929∗ -13.895
(b) Lesotho
Lag LogL AIC SC
0 2131.188 -19.664 -19.540
1 2347.783 -20.783 -19.669∗
2 2419.126 -20.850∗ -18.746
3 2470.333 -20.734 -17.639
4 2533.271 -20.724 -16.638
(c) Namibia
Lag LogL AIC SC
0 2219.416 -20.196 -20.072
1 2457.356 -21.784 -20.670∗
2 2576.654 -22.289 -20.184
3 2678.586 -22.635 -19.540
4 2754.285 -22.742∗ -18.657
(d) South Africa
Lag LogL AIC SC
0 3453.701 -31.468 -31.344
1 3682.650 -32.974 -31.860∗
2 3775.333 -33.236 -31.131
3 3856.498 -33.393 -30.298
4 3945.685 -33.623∗ -29.537
∗ Indicates the selected lag order by the criterion. AIC: Akaike information criterion,
SC: Schwarz information criterion
C.6 Variance Decomposition Results
Figure 1: Eswatini’s Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
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Figure 2: Lesotho’s Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Figure 3: Namibia’s Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
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Figure 4: South Africa’s Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
C.7 Robustness Checks
Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to Repo Rate Shock
(a) Eswatini (b) Lesotho
(c) Namibia (d) South Africa
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Panel III: Break Point Tests
(a) Eswatini
(b) Lesotho
(c) Namibia
(b) South Africa
